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Sept. 11, 1995

"If you want peace, prepare for war." (Roman proverb)

"You cannot simultaneously prevent war and prepare for war.

Einstein

Resolution: Both preparing for war, and failing to prepare for war, are highly inadequate ways of preventing war.

Preparing for war may be, in the very short run, more likely to prevent imminent war than failing to prepare for it: a lesser evil (than war). (That might have been true in the Thirties, as is generally claimed. Yet even then, mere preparations--they were made in Britain, actually on a larger scale for aircraft than in Germany--were not likely to deter Hitler. And more offensive actions looked so dangerous as to be virtually precluded at the time; hindsight here has been very unrealistic).

Or it may not be. Depending on circumstances, and on the ways that preparations for war are made (e.g., more or less offensively threatening to the adversary), and what policies actually accompany a failure to prepare for war, one or the other may seem the more likely to lead to or to prevent war.

But when it comes to addressing the fundamental causes of war and to reducing the likelihood of its occurrence or recurrence over the long run, then it is never enough either to prepare for war, or--like some pacifist slogans in the Thirties--simply to refuse to prepare for war. Nor can this be made good by preparing for war on a bigger or better scale.

If they are to address the larger problem of achieving peace and maintaining it over a long run, then either preparing for war or failing to prepare for it would have to be part of a much larger, more complex and diverse, multi-dimensional policy and set of programs. And the question would arise whether, in the short run or even in the long, preparing for war might be conflictual with or even preclusive of conceiving or implementing other aspects of the strategy of peace that are more fundamental, essential. (That question is less likely to arise with the option of failing to prepare for war: it is more obviously compatible with the long-run "practice of peacemaking." Still, in the short run--as in the Thirties, perhaps the single compelling example historically of a short period when absolute pacifism seems even less adequate than "preparedness" (e.g., British air defenses: radar and fighter planes and AA)--the reverse may be true.

us
Nicolson
was for China (Pakistan?)
North Korea
Israel?

However, by focussing on the single example of the Thirties and on future hypothetical cases which might present similar circumstances and options, we lose sight of the larger problem of preventing war over a longer run: especially, nuclear war, i.e., globally catastrophic war.

The "problem of deterrence" has in every historical period since 1939--and every year of the past 50--distracted attention from an overwhelmingly more important problem, at that very moment, of reducing the overall likelihood of war, crises, dangerous preparations for war, and readiness for catastrophic escalation of conflicts. And it has distracted attention and effort from opportunities to move toward the larger goal--opportunities much larger in some years than in others--but always, from options for peacemaking efforts incomparably more promising than the purely military armament and traditional or confrontational diplomacy being pursued at that moment.

Indeed, pursuit of the single goal of "deterrence"--whether of conventional or of nuclear attack or "provocation"--has created institutions, attitudes, goals, activities, a whole class of militarized officials, consultants and opinion-makers, that have a vested interest in pursuing solely military "solutions" and which directly oppose pursuing or even conceiving or considering or thinking about other approaches that are far more fundamental, promising, and essential to achieving both national and global security.

Thus, even in crises when military development and preparations seems to be part of the short-run solution, it comes at a cost, a danger: of consolidating attitudes and interest groups that actively oppose ways of thinking and awareness and active measures that address the larger, long-run problem effectively.

In every year of the nuclear age, testing, production, deployment and threat of nuclear weapons has been, and should have been seen, for each of the nations undertaking it, part of the problem, not part of the solution, of national security.

This might, conceivably and hypothetically, not have been so. If the past circumstances had been different than they were--specifically, if they had been what officials of the respective nations mistakenly believed or falsely claimed them to be--then there might have been a both plausible and valid case for acquiring nuclear weapons as part of a solution to a security problem. But that was never, not once, the case, not in any one year or for any nation. And least of all with respect to the United States, or the Soviet Union.

Above all, the rationales that each of these superpowers accepted--some publicly, some privately--for valuing nuclear weapons applied across the board to situations facing as-yet-non-

always
false
(as for
Hiroshima)
China?
etc.
SU?!

as-
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nuclear states. I.e., they legitimized and encouraged acquisition of nuclear weapons, and various uses of them, in a very broad set of states. This set the stage for widespread proliferation, threats, and regional nuclear wars or terrorism, when plutonium became much more widely available. And thanks in large part to the Atoms for Peace promotion of nuclear energy (itself, a legitimating public relations cover for US reliance on nuclear weapons) that time is now.

whole note
Aside from providing rationales and plutonium, the practices of the nuclear states virtually precluded their leading--or even being motivated to lead--an effective effort against proliferation and nuclear weapons use. Or from taking steps to give up the privileges of the nuclear club, to restrict their own reliance on and freedom of action with respect to nuclear weapons production and threat: steps of mutual self-restraint that are prerequisite to leadership against the general nuclear threat, or even to participation in such a campaign.

Thus, the doctrine and practice of deterrence has not only been inadequate, it has been fatally costly to efforts actually to preclude nuclear war or the large-scale non-nuclear war that could lead to it. Its dangers have greatly exceeded even its hypothetical, claimed, advantages: which have been consistently and uniformly misrepresented and divorced from actual circumstances, opportunities, and dangers.

That is true today, as acutely as it has ever been true in the past.

Thus, despite its plausibility in terms of certain hypothetical, narrowly-defined situations which have never yet obtained in reality, the doctrine and pursuit of deterrence should at last be seen as being, now and foreseeably, part of the problem, not the solution. It should be discarded: not because it could never, under any hypothetical circumstances, define plausibly a "lesser evil", but because it persists in being a fatal cover, distraction, obstacle and active instrument of opposition to policies that truly address the problem of security in the nuclear age.

Nuclear weapons, and deterrence doctrine, have been continuously iatrogenic.

"really existing deterrent policies" have always been a snare, a danger, a cover, based on delusion, a barrier to much more promising policies. They have led to a steady lowering of global security, and with it, the national security of the states pursuing them. And this is not a coincidence. The measures they call for and the states of mind and vested interests they induce almost inevitably work against an awareness and approaches that would actually increase security both in the short and the long run.

[compare: air strikes in Bosnia. Ending the arms embargo for the Muslims (as contrasted with really enforcing an embargo on the Serbs). refusing to recognize any valid interests or realistic fears of the Serbs--e.g., against the Croats, or against dominant fundamentalist Muslims, in a way that would permit a genuine coordinated policy with Russians. Seeing the Serbs as only terrorists, and as the only terrorists, when we and allies use terrorism just as freely and on just as large a scale when it suits us (see Croat expulsions of Serbs, with rape and murder, in Krajina, with our encouragement, praise and celebration). And our tolerance for Israeli first-use threats, as for our own].

Thus, I don't deny--as do pacifists and nuclear pacifists--that there are hypothetical circumstances (some of which have plausibly been claimed and believed to exist at various moments) which make a case for deterrence plausible (though rarely if ever, the actual carrying out of deterrent threats). Just as the Thirties provide a plausibility problem for absolute pacifists. But the singular example of the confrontation with Hitler [and the supposed lesson that the Allies should have invaded Germany to counter occupation of the Rhineland--or at least, acted within the Rhineland (was that possible?)] has been used to prolong the policies of World War II throughout the next half-century.

*actual
(defense
can be
justified)*

Such policies should never, at any moment, have been the whole of our security policy, or even the main part. And the actual nuclear policies we followed should not have been part at all--they should have been resisted and rejected, at every single point--as being actually the major, almost the only real threats to our security and survival.

give up...?

We must, urgently, transcend the paradigm of "deterrence": and of "national security" as it has been conceived.

This is the time for a paradigm shift. But such shifts do not simply come when they are needed, nor even when circumstances for them seem permissive. And the problems of shift in the social sciences and politics, and mass psychology and priorities, are different and much more intractable than in the physical sciences. That is our challenge.

Deterrence has never, even in the short run, promised a guarantee, a certainty, of avoiding nuclear war: any more than does any particular program of peacemaking. And in reality, deterrent policies for the US have in virtually every period been so provocative and dangerous that we would have been safer simply to forego them: when one looks at their longer-run consequences even within past decades. Still, simply foregoing them was never an adequate or best policy either.

Our defense intellectuals and politicians and officials serve interests that are antithetical to maximal reduction or elimination

of the major threats to our security and survival, dangers of war and above all of nuclear attacks on the US and elsewhere. These interests work to maintain their own institutional existence and short-run advantage, like all interests. But being what they are--military-industrial-university complexes, intelligence agencies, militarized Executive agencies--they need to keep alive the possibility of war for their own short-run "health" and long-run existence. So they work actively and passively to sustain attitudes and practices that preclude policies to reduce the probability of war and nuclear attacks radically, to a minimum.

[Analyze paradigms in politics and political science: the "problems" being addressed are not merely cognitive, but policy-oriented: what to do, what to aim at, what to value, how to achieve ends (not just, what affects what, what causes what, what patterns occur...still, similar problems occur in the physical sciences too: power-oriented, manipulative...especially, "applied sciences": e.g., weapons design!). And there are powerful social interest-groups that work to distract, delude, bar certain hypotheses or questions...of course, the paradigm concept points to the existence of similar interests in organized "science."]

The "problem of deterrence" has always been essentially irrelevant to the realistic problems of US security and foreign policy; "the wrong problem" to be thinking or worrying about, or working to solve.

At most, at certain times, it has been a minor part of the overall, pressing challenge of maintaining or improving security. And even that has been largely because of earlier efforts to "deter." Such efforts in the '60's gave rise, for example, to the existence of 10,000 Soviet warheads on high alert by the late '70's. These posed a genuine security problem, to which "deterrence" was not wholly irrelevant. But even then (in the 70's and 80's) actual US programs addressed to deterrence tended to exacerbate the danger of nuclear preemption on one side or the other. This was true both for the short-run (facing given Soviet capabilities) and in the longer run, provoking new, still more dangerous Soviet deployments and blocking effective efforts to transform the situation.

[Hypothesis: the misleading character of the "prisoners' dilemma" model is in its narrow definition of the situation. It is presented the way a prosecutor wants the prisoners to see it, precisely so as to get "perverse," traitorous behavior from them.

An experienced prisoner, or simply one coming from a criminal milieu, will understand that there are always other considerations present than those the "game-theorist"/prosecutor specifies. There is the question of his "rep" in the community, as a "stand-up guy" who can be trusted not to rat on a partner, or as a weakling or "fink," a rat. His future career is at stake. And beyond that: his

ability to stay alive in prison, or after he gets out, whether soon or late. Both his partner and his partner's friends, and the criminal community at large, may pay a price or take a risk, beyond short-run, narrowly-defined "rational" self-interest to punish a rat, or to take revenge. And at best, he will ruin his chances to be taken as a partner in future.

The game-theorist might say: all this is assumed to be taken account of in the payoff structure. Not so: the payoffs are presumed to be determined largely by the prosecutor; and in reality, he is not in a position to determine all these considerations for a given prisoner, or even to know how they look to that prisoner.

The element common to "what is left out" from the usual description of the game is the existence of an audience, or multiple audiences, for the choices made. The usual description is an extension of "Robinson Crusoe" decision-making, as if only three players existed in the world, and they would never meet again, or not after a definite number of plays.

Thus, this is an example of my concept of the role of "revealed preference": the importance of the communicative aspect of choice, its impact on reputation, image, expectations, evaluation by others, blame, reproach, punishment, choices by political constituencies, bosses, judges...

Such considerations on the influence of anticipated reactions by audiences to choice-as-visible-performance are generally as missing from game-theory as they are in the analysis of individual decision-making.

And as Dad pointed out in our last conversation: there is also the question of the effect of one's paradigm, policy, choices on one's character, and not only one's perceptions of one's character by others, but one's own values, persistent goals and traits: what one "teaches" oneself, one's children and others.

"Deterrence," since the beginning of the Manhattan Project and especially since its culmination at Nagasaki, has taught us and the world that it is all right to plan and under at least some circumstances to carry out the high-tech massacre of hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians. As Dad said: such instruction is not without danger. Danger of the end of "civilization" or of human extinction.

September 17, 1995 (Sunday)

Just as we should not speak of the "defense" budget or department but of the "military" or "war" department and the military or "arms" budget,

we should not speak of "deterrent" capability or policy or threats but of "deterrent massacre," or capability for "retaliatory massacre" or "retaliatory genocide" or "preemptive massacre" or "preventive massacre."

Massacre or genocide? This is the issue Markusen raises with respect to strategic bombing or nuclear war. He shows that the deliberate slaughter of masses of non-combatants--targeted for massacre because they are (citizens of a particular nation) living within a national territory. *inhabitants (the Koreans, POWs, in Hiroshima)*

unintended but intended
[The non-nationals, like the Koreans, American citizens and American POWs killed in Hiroshima were, from the point of view of LeMay, undesired "collateral damage." To call their deaths "inadvertent" or "unintended"--as if they were unforeseen and would have been averted if they had been foreseen, is misleading. When a bystander is used by an attacker as both a hostage and a shield by holding her in front of the attacker, and an adversary shoots the attacker through the body of the hostage, is the death of the hostage/shield "inadvertent" or "unintended"?

Comment on Hiroshima
Then there is the concept of "bonus" damage. LeMay regarded the population around a particular military target as "bonus" damage: their deaths to be "maximized" by choice of yield, ground burst, aiming point, perhaps direction of attack. The status as "secondary" rather than "primary" objective implies here merely that that particular group of people might not have been targeted by that sortie--under those circumstances, with that priority--in the absence of that military target. On the other hand, it might be equally true that that military target would not have been attacked under those circumstances in the absence of the surrounding population. That would mean that the claim that the population death was "merely bonus" or "secondary, collateral" was a cover, a deception, protecting the attacker (somewhat) from the charge of deliberate massacre.

as possible
LeMay claims in the preface to Mission With LeMay that he had tried to kill as few civilians as possible. This could only have meant, "as few as consistent with winning the war, primarily by killing civilians along with destroying industry, allowing generously for uncertainty in the number of civilians it will be necessary to destroy to persuade the enemy to surrender or to force collapse." This translates to: "I tried to kill as many enemy civilians as possible, as quickly as possible."

Given LeMay's objective of speed (for shock, maximum disruption and inability of the enemy to adapt by defenses or evacuation/flight) this amounts to genocidal intent. Neither in Japan nor in Russia was his maximal aspiration less than the extermination of the entire enemy population.

(Note his two quotes to Cohen:

"War is killing people. When you kill enough people the other guy quits."

"My requirement for a bomb against the Soviet Union is: One bomb for the Soviet Union."

(See his construction of SAC and of the SIOP on the model of the wiring of a single B-58.)

And his question to his weather officer, Roger Fisher, before the Tokyo raid: "How fast must the wind at ground level be blowing so that people can't escape?" (For the other cities--he wanted Kobe struck the next night, but had to settle for the following night--did he really want to allow any evacuation? Would he really have been content to destroy the housing and "household/neighborhood industry" but not the people, the workers including women and children along with the babies? Nah. As a matter of fact, he mentioned that when the houses were burned, many machines could be seen standing in the wreckage, presumably available for use if the workers survived: as happened in Hamburg with the restoration of industry after the firestorm. No, the workers had to be killed--LeMay mentions that entire families were involved--along with the old and the babies.

All this bears on my discussion with Lynn Eden a few days ago. [She believed that LeMay was interested only in destroying industry, by fire, not killing people. Wrong.]

Dream: I am asked by a young woman activist to address a rally in a stadium. She wants me to tell them that a grassroots movement must divorce itself from "politics" and lobbying, from "Washington." (Jackie Cabasso's argument to me on the way to Diablo Valley College two weeks ago. Like Dave Dellinger's position). I said no, I didn't agree with that at all.

We repeat this exchange when I do speak to the crowd, which is in a rectangular amphitheatre. There is no microphone, to my irritation; I have to shout. She goes off to find a microphone, but I yell, hoarsely.

"Every movement for social change that has succeeded...the

Revolutionary War, the ending of slavery..." She interrupts: those are within an imperial context; I reply, it doesn't matter; all successful movements for social change have relied both on grassroots, mass, spontaneous and organized popular resistance, obstruction, demonstration, and on political efforts to build coalitions and to influence legislation, enforcement, representation and executive composition (elections, lobbying, etc.)."

She breaks in: "You are good at hobnobbing with officials and elites..."

I shout (to crowd, at her): "Fuck you. I've also been arrested more than 60 times. There weren't many officials in those jails. For my first arrest, I faced 115 years in prison..."

(Pat says I said this loudly in my sleep, waving my arms: the first part.)

Simple, absolute moral principles don't settle all serious questions or eliminate dilemmas.

Thus, when Peter Weiss tells me that even threat of or preparation for possible massacre, as a retaliatory deterrent (a second-strike threat: AJW's rationale/front/cover--in Air Force eyes, for what they intended to be an enlarged first-strike force: with the addition of "second-strike damage-limiting") (like protecting against the Genocide Convention, under Nixon: no targetting of population "per se") is absolutely forbidden;

he is adopting the position of the anti-abortion movement, the "pro-life" movement, which says that killing a foetus after the moment of conception is absolutely forbidden, criminal. Can public policy--or individual choice--really be decided on such a simple basis? Is it that simple and clearcut?

In the case of abortion: A mother's decision can usually be assumed to be sufficiently anguished and serious so that abortion will be undertaken only when there is a strong "necessity defense," only when it is plausibly a "lesser evil," where the mother is the best judge of that. So the decision can best be delegated to her--to weigh the interests of the foetus (and society) against her own. (Of course--particularly when abortion is safe, cheap and convenient--as for the wealthy--there will also be "frivolous" abortions where the necessity argument is not very strong, or is not seriously applied, as opposed to convenience. But this risk--to foetuses and social interests (which cut both ways)--could still be accepted as better than making the government intervene to decide or punishing all women who choose abortion.)

But in the case of nuclear massacre...the usual national presumption that Presidents and DOD's decide wisely enough, with enough foresight and enough concern for "enemy" and neutral populations, for future generations and for ecology, to be allowed to make these preparations in secret, is not justified by (my) real experience.

Nevertheless, neither is it true that the incentives to deter nuclear attack or major conventional war can be dismissed as frivolous, unworthy or as clearly and absolutely precluding the threat of possible nuclear retaliation. Neither officials nor populations can be clearly condemned for considering or even choosing such a deterrent. To do so is both self-righteous and unpersuasive.

(It is true that there is no real case ^{newly} for making deterrent threats maximally "credible" by making them certain to be carried out, at the cost of risking both false alarms and actual implementation if they fail. This cannot really be defended as "necessary" to deter rational opponents (or effective at deterring less -than-rational opponents). It is a cost of the military machinery taking seriously--being deceived by--the cover story intended to justify the policy and expanded expenditures to the public and to "legalists" and "moralists".)

On the third hand: I have to admit that Peter Weiss' comment to me that I was only "90% moral" reflecting my RAND background, while enraging, did serve to provoke me to very prolonged and ultimately fruitful moral reflection. ^{others?}

Thus: there is a useful role for a self-righteous, narrow-minded, absolutist, horse's ass, to proclaim "absolute principles" obstinately.

(GTM)

[Process comment, reflecting my discussion with Pat yesterday. Note the way I wander, ramble, pursue associations, insert long "footnotes," in my thinking and writing process. I should exercise restraint in doing this--expressing myself this way--in lecturing; and in social conversation (as I did do, in listening to her in the hot tub yesterday, restraining my repeated impulses to comment, to question, to suggest analogies or implications or associations, to interrupt at all. My restraint bore spectacular fruit. (Pat found herself opening up to me--on being listened to (with my facial reactions mirroring her own expression)--and wanted to be sucked; leading to love-making ending with my own spectacular orgasm. The key, after all; as she had always predict! Talk about reinforcement...)

And such restraint might also apply even to drafting, as well as to final copy. But this must be made compatible with

remembering and recording the various associations that come to me after dreaming or in the shower. Perhaps all the thoughts can be written in a fast list, first, in short form; or associations can be dumped initially in a separate file.]